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As structural issues such as organized crime and corruption deepen in Mexico, migrants 
are caught in the crosshairs, resulting in migratory routes rife with danger and a worsening 
human rights record. This paper explores how human rights practices for migrants in Mexico can 
be improved with respect to state policy. I begin by establishing the international and domestic 
law in place before moving into an assessment of the extent to which rights are guaranteed. I 
addresses the disconnect between legal instruments and what happens on the ground, analyzing 
the influence of securitization as well as social and structural factors at play against migrants in 
policy-making and implementation. 
 
Finally, I propose policy solutions in light of protection gaps and constraints, arguing for 
a non-traditional regularization of migration through Mexico that would free migratory routes 
from organized crime networks that pose the majority of the risk. In addition, I advocate for: the 
incorporation of the National Human Rights Commission into the judicial system in order to 
provide accountability for crimes committed against migrants, superior training of state 
migration workers and streamlined protocol, along with funding increases for COMAR, 
Mexico’s refugee agency. 
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Chapter 1 - Home is the mouth of a shark 
Introduction 
 
 
Migration as a human phenomena has always existed. Modern migration is deceptively 
complicated; it is not simply about individuals passing over a border, or the lands between one 
boundary and the next. Today’s migrants find themselves at the intersection of movement and 
politics. 
Since 2014, the Central American migration crisis has skyrocketed, with increasing 
numbers of individuals choosing to leave Central America and beginning the journey north to the 
United States. The crisis is rooted in economic and political grievances. In the 1980s and 1990s, 
a series of civil wars ravaged the region of Central America known as the Northern Triangle - 
Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. In El Salvador, nearly seventy five thousand died 
(1979-1992), with that number rising to as many as two hundred thousand in the neighboring 
Guatemala (1960-96). The result was widespread institutional failure throughout Central 
America. As government and state institutions crumbled, gangs were deported back from the 
U.S. to fill the power vacuum and assume a parallel role.  Criminal organizations have a 1
monopoly over violence and in some instances even offer social services, entering into a 
symbiosis with communities that legitimize their power. Today, MS-13 and MS-18, the region’s 
two most powerful gangs, boast an estimated membership of as many as eighty five thousand.  2
1 Meyer and Pachico (2018) describe this process. It is important to note the influence of U.S. deportation policy in 
the rise of gangs in the Northern Triangle. Deporting gang members back to states weakened from civil war allowed 
them to gain widespread power quickly. MS-13 is a notable example of this phenomenon and one of the most deadly 
gangs in Central America today. 
2 ​Congressional Research Service (2016) 
2 
Their control, however, is brutal. Gangs such as MS-13 recruit from teenagers and adolescents in 
local communities. The punishment for the failure to join is death. Their violence has reached 
such a level that the region consistently tops global crime indices.  3
Because of gang violence, there is a lack of state protection for Central Americans. For 
many, statehood exists only in theory. Their governmental institutions are so weak that they 
might as well be negligible. Many Central Americans, in effect, have no rights, nor the right to 
have them. While once they reach Mexico, they are undocumented, on the periphery of state 
belonging and far from home. They are Arendt’s refugees, lacking the guarantee of rights from 
the states to which they belong and subjected to the violence of organized crime groups.  They 4
flee across international borders attempting to find shelter abroad, but North American states do 
not want them. Their failure to receive neither citizenship nor temporary protection forces them 
to live undocumented with the fear of being apprehended and sent back. They have no power in 
comparison to North American governance structures. When the human rights law that does exist 
is not respected, there are next to no measures by which they can seek recourse. They are subject 
to the whims of the police.  Their statelessness denies them the ability to defend themselves 5
against institutions both domestically and abroad. 
Mexico, by nature of sitting midway between Central America and the United States, 
incurs the majority of transit migration. Central Americans travel through a complex system of 
routes, oftentimes with the aid of smugglers called ‘coyotes,’ to avoid detection by state 
3 Council on Foreign Relations (2018) describes the history of civil war in the Northern Triangle. 
4 ​In ​Origins of Totalitarianism​, the political philosopher Hannah Arendt describes the refugee as one who not only 
lacks rights, but the right to have rights. This is, per her view, what it means to be without state protection. A refugee 
is one who is persecuted and made ‘outcast’ by the state, but rights are guaranteed by the state. Without its 
protection, the refugee lacks neither rights nor the ability to have them. 
5 Kulish (2018) writes on the relationship between Central American migrants in Mexico and the police. 
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authorities and thereby deportation.  Mexican migratory policy, however, is heavily influenced 6
by the United States, which has put increasing pressure since 2014 on Mexico and Central 
America to handle the Central American forced migration crisis in ways that appeal to its 
contemporary anti-immigration interests.  Policies such as increased policing and militarization 7
of the Mexico/Guatemala border as well as increased deportation of apprehended irregular 
Central American migrants are evidence of this.  8
Mexico balances humanitarian concerns with pressure from the United States and its own 
national agenda while migrants move across its borders. On Friday, October 19, 2018, a migrant 
caravan from Honduras arrived at the Mexican border. Its numbers swelled to over 2,000 and 
continued to increase, with all the participants intending to travel to the United States.  The 9
caravan, however, was stopped on the Mexican border. The United States put pressure on both 
Mexico and Honduras to ensure that it would not allow them to enter, levying the threat of 
foreign aid reduction as a consequence for allowing the caravan to pass.  Meanwhile, thousands 10
of forced migrants were caught in the crosshairs of competing interests with no state willing to 
offer protection. 
The result is a North American refugee protection system with large gaps. Unlike other 
forced migration crises which have resulted in refugee camps such as Dadaab in Kenya  or 11
Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh,  there are no camps in Mexico or the United States. There is 12
6 Comisión Nacional de Derechos Humanos 
7 Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
8 Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
9 Cuffe (2018) 
10 Cuffe (2018) 
11 Grandi (2017) 
12 ​Human Rights Watch (2018) 
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nowhere for Central American forced migrants to take shelter for an extended period outside of 
their country of origin beyond asylum, which is hardly a guarantee. 
Within Mexico is a decentralized collection of shelters called albergues, run by churches, 
NGOs, and community groups that offer food, shelter, and information to migrants travelling 
through.  The system of albergues, however, offers only temporary protection outside of the 13
state. As they work under minimal resources, serving irregular migrants seeking to avoid state 
detection so as to reach the United States, albergues must operate on a sub-national level and 
cannot provide assistance to all migrants who need it. As such, they fail to offer even the 
minimum protections that a camp might.  Without the security of a stable place to call home and 14
the okay of a state that deems their presence acceptable, Central American migrants must move 
quickly and may only use alburgues as a brief respite. 
As opposed to protection, the North American immigration system relies on deportation 
and militarization to keep Central American mass migration at bay. Central American migrants 
are labelled as a security risk by the United States, which claims that they usher in gang violence, 
drugs, and instability.  Under this rhetoric, Central Americans become a threat to national 15
security instead of a vulnerable population in need of international assistance. However, Central 
American migration is largely due to institutional breakdown and gang violence. The migrants 
who flee across North America to seek protection are victims of the organized crime violence 
that North American states claim they create and bolster.  16
13 National Human Rights Commission of Mexico (2018) 
14 National Human Rights Commission of Mexico (2018) 
15 Hesson (2018) 
16 Meyer, Maureen and Pachico, Elissa (2018) 
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The way that U.S. citizens and media speak and write about the migration crisis not only 
informs broad understandings of it, but can also affect policy change that pushes the United 
States further away from protecting migrants. One example is the U.S. government’s 
"securitization" rhetoric in the migration discussion. Portraying migrants as violent threats and 
migration as an existential security risk to the nation dehumanizes migrants and bolsters 
arguments that they should not be protected. ​Fundamentally, Central American forced migration 
is not about United States national security. It is about the results of violence, crisis, and 
instability to such a degree that one makes the choice to leave behind everything they know to 
seek shelter abroad. It is about individuals and their need for protection. 
Due to securitization policies, regions like the United States and Western Europe fail to 
understand the nature of forced migration crises accurately, seeing them as things that happen to 
them and within their territory, whereas the conflicts that produce mass migration occur 
elsewhere and the majority of the migrants themselves are not hosted by the Global North nor 
make it to their borders. In this way, the manner in which state rhetoric frames the Central 
American forced migration crisis distorts how it is understood. 
This paper addresses the disconnect that exists between policy and the current situation. I 
focus my discussion of Central American migration in Mexico as the region within which the 
majority of abuses occur. I offer an analysis framed in human rights, arguing for particular 
protections for migrants based on their humanity rather than belonging to a particular nationality. 
Human rights act as an equalizer. They are an affirmation of baseline treatment that individuals 
should be afforded by nature of being human. They are a denial of circumstances that reach 
beyond this standard and violate a certain aspect of our humanity. In this paper, I demonstrate 
6 
that human rights have not been respected for Central American migrants in Mexico and that 
state action should address these concerns. I offer concrete policy solutions that aim to fill the 
protection gaps that exist. 
I begin by establishing the legal context, offering an overview of Mexican and 
international law pertaining to migration framed in a sociohistorical context that explains the 
trajectory of law and the social forces that shaped it. Next, I assess the extent to which law is put 
into practice, demonstrating widespread non-compliance and the breakdown of policy on a local 
level. I addresses the disconnect between current policy and what happens on the ground, 
analyzing the influence of securitization as well as social and structural factors at play against 
migrants in policy-making and implementation. 
After pinpointing the protection gaps, I assess possible solutions in light of existing 
recommendations, arguing for a non-traditional regularization of migration through Mexico that 
would free migratory routes from organized crime networks that pose the majority of the risk. In 
addition, I advocate primarily for: the incorporation of the Mexican human rights court into the 
judicial system in order to provide accountability for crimes committed against migrants, 
superior training of state migration workers and streamlined protocol, along with state funding 
for NGOs already doing the groundwork to provide safety and security for migrants in Mexico. 
This paper does not offer an ideal humanitarian vision of migration policy nor assume 
that such problems are too difficult or broadly institutionally influenced to be addressed. Human 
rights policy need not perfect crisis management in order to be effective. This paper argues that 
there are concrete, manageable actions that Mexico can and should take to alleviate some of the 
abuses occurring within its territory. Despite an array of factors at play that complicate 
7 
policymaking and dampen the capacity of Mexico to act in the human rights interest of migrants, 
positive change is within its reach.  
8 
Chapter 2 - Está pero no está 
Legal Context 
 
 
Understanding the human rights context for migration within Mexico requires 
understanding the legal context. In addition to international human rights treaties to which 
Mexico is a signatory, Mexico has produced a number of laws pertaining directly to migration, 
human rights, and population control that clarify and expand the provisions outlined by the 
country’s Constitution and international law. Unlike some states that must ratify international 
treaties legally before they are incorporated into domestic law, the Mexican Constitution 
specifies that the international treaties it signs are incorporated automatically.  As such, there is 17
an expanded array of law that applies to migrants in Mexico beyond the country’s domestic law. 
In this chapter, I will provide a background of Mexican legal history pertaining to 
migration law with an emphasis on the factors that shaped it. I will then offer a summary of the 
domestic and international legal architecture, including relevant provisions, in order to establish 
a picture of the applicable law and its relevance to Central American migration. 
As with many states, Mexico’s migration policy can be read as a blueprint for the way in 
which it understands itself as a nation. Borders, the physical manifestation of the state, are 
enforced by policy that controls who is allowed access and who should be kept out. In the 
nineteenth through the early twentieth century, Mexico incentivized foreign in-migration to 
17 ​Article 1 of the Mexican Constitution states that “In  the  United  Mexican  States,  all  individuals  shall  be 
entitled  to  the  human  rights granted  by  this  Constitution  and  the  international  treaties  signed  by  the 
Mexican State,  as  well  as  to  the  guarantees  for  the  protection  of  these  rights.  Such  human rights  shall  not 
be  restricted  or  suspended,  except  for  the  cases  and  under  the conditions established by this Constitution 
itself.” 
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encourage population growth and modernization. Large numbers of immigrants were allowed in 
with relatively minimal restrictions.  Its immigration policies remained liberal up until the 18
1970s, a reflection of the direction in which Mexico intended to go as a nation.  19
As Central America entered into a period of war and instability, however, large numbers 
of migrants began to move across the southern border. During this time, Mexico’s government 
no longer viewed its population as insufficient for reaching its development goals. Rather than 
continuing a policy that encouraged foreigners to migrate and naturalize, Mexico implemented 
immigration restrictions in the wake of Central American migration. This exemplifies the ways 
in which Mexican response to migration reflects deeper concerns. 
The result was the ​General Law of Population​ (Ley General de Población), enacted in 
1974, an attempt to tighten the border and control the changing dynamics of migration. The 
General Law of Population laid the groundwork for decades of migration policy that made it 
difficult for foreigners to gain legal entry and residence. Requirements included that migrants be 
approved on the grounds of: physical and mental health, economic viability for the Mexican 
state, security, and even the ability to procure private healthcare.  In addition to strict entry 20
requirements, the General Law of Population levied harsh controls on migrants travelling 
through Mexican territory irregularly. Entering Mexico without valid travel documents was a 
felony offense punishable by up to two years in prison for a first offense and ten for a second.  21
The result was a drastic reduction in the number of migrants able to gain entry or stay within 
Mexico.  22
18 Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
19 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
20 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
21 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
22 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
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This is in contrast to the migratory situation on Mexico’s northern border. The beginning 
of the General Law of Population coincided with large emigration flows of Mexican nationals to 
the United States. In terms of migration, Mexico’s relationship with the United States was the 
opposite of that with Central America. Instead of being on the net receiving end of migratory 
flows, at the time the General Law of Population was enacted in 1974, Mexico was sending 
vastly more migrants to the United States than it was receiving in return. The result was a role 
reversal. As opposed to being the one with the choice to admit or deny, Mexico was faced with 
closed doors in the North and prejudice against those who managed to gain entry.  23
As the United States enforced increasingly harsher policies towards Mexican migrants, 
Mexico decried U.S. action as prejudicial and unjust.  The response from the United States was 24
to point a mirror towards Mexico’s own policies. Due in part to the General Law of Population, 
criticisms of harsh immigration policy in the North fell on deaf ears. 
Despite the hypocrisy of Mexican policy in contrast to its demands for its own emigrants, 
reform did not come until decades after the General Law of Population was enacted. Criticism 
from the United States  provided the impetus and the means for reform. In 2011, Mexico ushered 
in a new era of migration policy that restructured the foundation of migration in Mexican 
territory. The result was a collection of laws that remain Mexico’s legal migration code: 
amendments to the 2008 General Law of Population; the 2011 Law of Refugees, Complementary 
Protection, and Political Asylum; and the 2011 Law of Migration. 
However, Mexican law is often based upon international law. As such, it is important to 
consider the migration and human rights treaties to which Mexico is party. These include: the 
23 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
24 ​Waller, Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(including the ‘67 Protocol), the Cartagena Declaration, and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. 
Originally written in 1948, the ​Universal Declaration of Human Rights​ is intended to 
be an international agreement to establish baseline human rights. Its thirty articles outline an 
array of social, cultural, and economic rights, including the right to petition for asylum  and the 25
right to a nationality.  The latter is an interesting assertion of the primacy of state-centered rights 26
in a human rights document, the assumption of human rights being rights inherent in the 
individual rather than a state as guarantor. The Universal Declaration is frequently cited as the 
founding human rights document and, as such, is a cornerstone of the principles discussed 
throughout the paper. 
The ​1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees​ is the core international treaty 
establishing the legal precedent for the treatment of refugee populations. Its provisions are 
grounded in Article 14 of the Universal Declaration, which affords the right to seek protection 
abroad.  Written following the Second World War, its vision and content are heavily influenced 27
by European mass migration.  Finding itself with redrawn borders and a population in disarray 28
and diaspora, the international community was forced to come to terms with how to deal with 
forced migration flows. Of particular importance is how it laid the foundation for the definition 
of the refugee: one with a well-founded fear of persecution.  29
25 Article 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “​everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in 
other countries asylum from persecution.” 
26 Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to a nationality.” 
27 ​The introductory note of the 1951 Refugee Convention by Antonio Guterres, the 10th High Commissioner for 
Refugees of the United Nations, elaborates on this legal basis. 
28 ​Price, M. E. (2006) 
29 ​Price, M. E. (2006) 
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The persecution clause has grown to encompass a wide body of literature and debate. 
While persecution as the basis of refugee status might make sense in the postwar context, as 
forced migration crises evolve, its definition has become increasingly restrictive, leaving swathes 
of forced migrants without legal grounds for international protection. This is particularly true in 
the case of the Central American migration, with only some migrants falling into the proper 
categories for protection abroad and others deported back to a region unable to guarantee their 
survival, let alone the enjoyment of the full spectrum of their human rights. 
The 1951 Refugee Convention and its ‘67 Protocols remain the core treaties on forced 
migration on a global scale, with the exception of the United Nations Convention on 
Statelessness, which has tangential application to migrants. However, regional treaties have 
emerged to deal with migration on a smaller scale. Chief among these treaties is the Refugee 
Convention of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the Cartagena Declaration among 
Latin American states. Both treaties were developed on the foundation of the UN Refugee 
Convention but adapted to their regions’ particular migratory contexts. 
This paper is primarily concerned with the Cartagena Declaration as the regional 
document governing migration from Central America through Mexico, although it acknowledges 
that treaties and policy exist in broader conversation and a treatment of the law focused purely on 
Latin America disregards this interrelationship. The ​Cartagena Declaration on Refugees​, 
enacted in 1984 in Cartagena de los Indios, Colombia, expanded the definition of the refugee to 
include “persons who have fled their country because their lives, security or freedom have been 
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violation of 
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order.” This 
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broadened definition allows for many more individuals to qualify for protections under regional 
refugee law and offers an example of how law can adapt to evolving migrations. 
In addition to documents such as the Universal Declaration and international migration 
treaties, the UN ​Convention on the Rights of the Child​ is of particular importance to the 
Mexican context. Many of the migrants passing through Mexico are undocumented child 
migrants in a heightened state of vulnerability due to the nature of gang violence and recruitment 
mechanisms in Central America.  This convention serves as in instrument in expanding the legal 30
protections afforded to a large proportion of the migrants in Mexican territory. 
Now that international law has been considered, I move into a discussion of the Mexican 
domestic law applicable to migrants. The adoption of the ​Law of Migration​ in 2011 marks a 
turning point in Mexico’s conceptualization of migration. Before 2010, discussion of transit 
migration as a political issue was minimal.  With the emergence of the Law of Migration and 31
reforms in the legal architecture surrounding migration, however, a new attention was given to 
the issue. Inherent in the reforms was a recognition of the scale and importance of the Central 
American migration crisis as both a national and regional concern.  By passing legislation 32
specifically intended to cover migration issues, the legislation marked a fundamental first step in 
moving towards a human rights-oriented policy approach. 
Broadly, the Law of Migration details how government agencies should deal with 
migration. It offers guidelines for how to handle migration on a logistical level, from visa 
issuance, to apprehension and detention protocol, to requirements for naturalization. For the 
purposes of my discussion, the Law of Migration serves as an important foundation and 
30 ​For a comprehensive look at gang activity in the Northern Triangle, see Seelke (2016). 
31 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
32 ​Gonzalez-Murphy and Koslowski (2011) 
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recognition on behalf of the state of the importance of migrant rights. However, its poor 
implementation leaves it an ideal to work towards and its protection gaps are areas of policy 
focus. 
The ​Law of Refugees, Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum​ covers a 
subset of migration law pertaining to forced migration. The literature organizes migration into 
two categories: forced and not forced. The notion of whether or not migration is forced is 
arguable, as there is often an element of choice and migrants are autonomous actors that exercise 
a degree of control over their migration. The difference in forced migration lies in the conditions 
under which an individual flees. If no option exists whereby one might stay and have the full 
extent of their human rights respected, their migration might be considered ‘forced.’  33
The Law of Refugees, Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum carves out a 
legal code for cases within this grey area: who should be considered appropriate for asylum and 
refugee status within Mexico; how their cases should be processed; and which agencies have 
jurisdiction over specific types of migration and how they interact. The law outlines explicit 
regulations for the management of asylum cases that include details such as the maximum length 
of time in detainment (60 days)  up to the minimum number of meals required.  34 35
33 ​‘Forced migration’ is not a legal distinction. That being said, Gibney and Shacknove (1985) provide theoretical 
frameworks for how we might understand the phenomenon that I draw on in my discussion. 
34 ​Article 24 of the Law of refugees, Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum specifies a maximum of 15 
consecutive work days of detention with the exception of cases in which obtaining documentation from a migrant’s 
country of nationality proves particularly difficult and necessitates delays. Regardless, detention should not exceed 
60 days. 
35 ​Article 107 of the Law of Migration says that “Attend  to  the  nutritional  needs  of  the  foreigner  detained, 
offering  him  or  her  three  meals  per  day.  The  Institute  must  ensure  that  food  is  of  adequate  quality.  
Individuals  with  special  nutritional  needs,  such  as  children,  adolescents,  elderly people, and pregnant or 
lactating women, will receive an adequate diet so that their health is not affected while their migratory status is being 
defined.” 
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Although derived from law, policy is an independent construction, a means of actualizing 
law. However, in Mexico, policy has failed to bring law to fruition. Mexico has struggled with 
corruption since the end of the revolution and the establishment of its democracy. As evidenced 
by the legal architecture outlined by the domestic and international law, Mexico has a 
progressive outlook on migration. But only in theory. Law exists insomuch as its capacity to be 
followed. The case for Mexico, unfortunately, is that its migration law often is not.  36
This phenomenon is referred to by some as ​está pero no está​, or the law “is there but it’s 
not there.” Mexico has a large body of progressive migration legislation that is not enforced. 
Provisions outlined for migrants in the Law of Migration or the Law of Refugees, 
Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum give the impression of a utopian society in 
which irregular migration risks nothing more than the prospect of deportation. The reality, 
however, is that migrants in Mexico face an immense amount of insecurity and rights violations 
with next to no institutional repercussions or means to seek recourse.  Were the law outlined in 37
the aforementioned documents followed explicitly, there would not be a human rights crisis to 
the extent that there is for migrants in Mexico today.  
What would cause Mexico to enact a body of progressive migration legislation that it is 
not implementing? What forces are pushing Mexico against acting in favor of the human rights 
of its migrants? What sort of calculus does the state undergo in pursuing seemingly progressive 
policy while a reality of abuse and violations rests beneath the surface? Coming to terms with the 
answers to these questions is at the crux of working towards improvements for the safety and 
security of migrants in Mexico. 
36 ​For information on the implementation of human rights law in Mexico, see reports by the Mexican Commission 
for the Defense and Promotion of Human Rights. 
37 ​See the work of the Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights for more information. 
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For migrants in Mexico, rights are a dream of politics and philosophy with no grounding 
in their own reality. They are there, but they are not there. Establishing a system in which rights 
for migrants might flourish, even within the networks of corruption and crime that plague 
Mexico, should be a primary goal for a state looking to act in the best interest of its security and 
the common humanity of individuals moving within its borders. This will be a foundation of this 
paper’s discussion moving forward.  
17 
Chapter 3 - There’s just so much road ahead 
Abuses on the Migrant Trail 
 
 
Public discourse in the United States focuses on the U.S.-Mexico border as the beginning 
of the migration narrative. The dangers it poses for those who wish to cross are centered: the Rio 
Grande and the bodies it consumes, border patrol and the security mechanisms that work to 
ensure undocumented migrants cannot breech it, the process of avoiding state authorities after 
crossing, and the challenges of living undocumented. The border has taken on an image and a 
significance in the United States that transcends and centers it as the core of the journey, the 
singular hurdle that stands in the way between migrants and their destination. It is easy to be left 
with the impression that Mexico is but a small part of the migration, a bit of land that might take 
days to cross. 
The reality, however, is that the majority of the insecurity that migrants face in traveling 
from Central America to the United States exists in Mexico. For migrants travelling North, 
Mexico is the great barrier that they must cross; the border that separates the United States and 
Mexico is but the end of a much longer journey. The failure to address Mexico’s role in 
significant human rights abuses related to Central American migration has hindered the 
international community’s capacity to act and has allowed for the continuation of a human rights 
crisis that is only escalating. As such, effective human rights policy must work to address 
Mexico and the abuses and insecurity faced within it. 
18 
The roots of these misconceptions about Central American migration originate in part 
from the established narratives surrounding regional movement. The history of Mexicans seeking 
entry into the United States--and constituting the primary population of undocumented 
migrants-- have cemented an idea in the public consciousness about migration from Latin 38
America. The archetype is the poor economic migrant trying to gain entry into the United States 
to better his or her life or the lives of their family members, not a forced migrant or refugee 
fleeing for their survival. Notions of Central American migration are seen through the lens of 
these stereotypes that refract reality and our ability to separate what exactly is happening today 
from earlier migrations. 
The Central American migration that has accelerated over the course of the last decade, 
however, is a separate phenomenon. It has occurred in response to a variety of sending factors, in 
turn produced by separate socio historical factors unique to the Northern Triangle. In addition, 
Mexicans decades ago versus Central Americans today move over Mexico in different ways 
reflective of their relationships with the state. Perhaps more importantly, they move within 
entirely separate security contexts, both because of their nationalities and because of the 
changing dynamics of insecurity in the region. 
Central Americans are undocumented within Mexico as they are in the United States. 
Similar prejudice against migrants exists in Mexico as it does within the United States. But 
unlike in the United States, organized crime has Mexico in a chokehold, with a monopoly on 
illicit markets. As drug trafficking groups have gained power and influence within Mexico, their 
control over undocumented migration has sharpened. Drug traffickers occupy the top of the 
38 ​Although undocumented migration is often difficult to evaluate, data is widely available on this phenomenon. The 
Migration Policy Institute offers current numbers. Precise demographics, however, are impossible to calculate. 
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pyramid of Mexican illicit markets and tax smugglers, wielding the threat of violence against 
them or the migrants they carry for the failure to pay.  39
As mentioned previously, corruption is a significant factor in the breakdown of law and 
policy. Mexico has federal, state, and local police jurisdictions with their own bureaucracies and 
power structures. At any level, however, police in Mexico are paid minimum salaries for their 
work.  The lack of monetary compensation leads some to be swayed by bribes from organized 40
crime networks operating within their territory.  Even officers who might not be so quick to be 41
swayed by a bit of extra income might be forced to work with organized criminal groups through 
the threat of violence.  42
The various illicit economies that operate beneath the surface of Mexican society are 
inextricably linked, and it can be difficult to separate one from another. ​Los narcotraficantes 
(“the drug traffickers”) occupy the highest position at the top of the pyramid, controlling drug 
trafficking, migrant smuggling operations, and local politics to different extents, depending on 
the particular group and region in question.  The result is that police corruption affects 43
organized criminal actors, affects drug trafficking operations, and affects migrants in turn who 
are caught between the crosshairs. These various forces that influence migrant security deepen 
together and further complicate the situation for those moving through Mexico irregularly.  
39 ​Slack and Campbell (2016) describe the linkages among illicit economies in Mexico. 
40 ​The National System of Social Security in Mexico published a 2011 report with police pay broken down by state. 
The national average was $9250.28 pesos monthly. 
41 ​The work of Sabet on the Tijuana police force explains the relationship between pay and corruption among the 
forces, including the economic decisions individual police make when weighing ethical considerations alongside 
monetary incentives. 
42 ​Sabet studies the threat of force as well. See Martinez for journalism that includes interviews with police that 
describe work under threats from organized crime. 
43 ​Slack and Campbell (2016) describe the relationship between illicit and licit state activities in the U.S./Mexico 
border region. They characterize illicit activities as struggling for power and dominance, with narco trafficking as 
the most powerful. Migrants, then, are subjected to double violence both from the state as well as illicit 
organizations. 
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The disconnect between law and what plays out on the ground extends far beyond police 
corruption. The culture of ​está pero no está​ pervades Mexican society. Central Americans 
migrating through Mexico are faced with a country that has placed yet further borders against 
them. Irregular migrants are easily identifiable in Mexico, whether by language or clothing or 
whatever other social marker might be used to classify, rank, and understand the group from the 
‘other.’  44
Mexicans understand that the journey is costly and that migrants are desperate to make it 
to the United States.  Consequently, irregular migrants in Mexico frequently face upcharges on 45
everything from bottled water to hotel rooms.  When confronted by authorities, migrants are 46
given the option to pay increasingly higher fees so as to avoid detention and deportation and 
therefore be allowed to continue their journey.  47
This amounts to an immense system of corruption that migrants must pass through to 
migrate through Mexico. This is further compounded by the prevalence of xenophobia and 
racism against Central Americans, who receive second-class treatment by nature of their national 
origin. The result is that law is buried in a web of institutional factors that keep it from becoming 
anything beyond ink on a page. As such, there are few checks on the system, leaving migrants 
subject to organized crime groups and corrupt authorities to whom they are nothing more than 
pawns in an underground economy. 
44 ​The work of Oscar Martínez and interviews with Central American migrants describe the way race and power 
shape their migration. 
45 ​Kulish (2018) reports on the economics of migration through Mexico by the case of a Honduran man who 
describes the upcharges he encountered and the bribes frequently given to INM officials to avoid deportation. 
46 ​Martínez and Kulish (2018) 
47 ​Martínez and Kulish (2018) 
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In the course of this chapter, I seek to describe and explain these concerns relating to 
migrants’  passage through Mexico, organizing my discussion by the legal frameworks outlined 
previously. I partition the rights that migrants enjoy into three categories that highlight the 
predominant protection gaps that must be filled in order to guarantee their full application and 
improve the human rights situation. 
I begin by addressing the right to security, discussing murder, assault, disappearance, 
kidnapping, unsafe routes, and the role of socioeconomic status as key barriers. I then move on 
to a discussion of the right to due process and information, addressing institutional and state 
organizational failure in handling migrant populations. I end by outlining gaps in refugee and 
asylum protections, emphasizing conditions of detention as a key failure in the provision of these 
rights for forced migrants in Mexico as an important subset of the migrant population with 
particular vulnerabilities that must be addressed. Taken as a whole, this chapter seeks to offer a 
panorama of what a Central American migrant faces in their migration through Mexico, 
summarizing the human rights situation as it exists today as a primer for discussions of policy 
options that might work to address these concerns. 
 
 
  
22 
The Right to Security 
 
The right to security is a foundation of the human rights framework and perhaps the most 
critical issue facing migrants in Mexico. Established in Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights  and Article 66 of the Law of Migration,  migrants have the right to life and the 48 49
security of person while moving through Mexico, regardless of their legal status. Despite the 
law, however, migrants encounter a vast array of security risks in their journey. 
Information on migration through Mexico is sparse and often outdated. The dynamics of 
migration through the region change and reports published as soon as a year or two ago do not 
necessarily capture what is occurring today. Furthermore, few migrants who “complete” their 
migration and make it to the United States speak about their experiences due to residual trauma 
and distrust of the state. As such, I rely on personal accounts and journalism to fill in the gaps in 
the data and provide a more complete picture of what today’s migrants face in movement 
through Mexico. 
Throughout this chapter, I incorporate information from the work of Oscar Martínez, a 
journalist from El Salvador who writes on Central American migration. In 2010, Martínez spent 
a year following migrants on the trail and published their stories in a book titled ​Los Migrantes 
que no importan​ (“The Migrants Who Don’t Matter”). His work offers a look into what 
migration through Mexico is like on the ground that provides supplementary qualitative data for 
my discussion. However, given that ​Los migrantes que no importan​ was published in 2013, I 
48 ​Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and 
security of person” 
49 ​Article 66 of the Law of Migration says that “a migrant’s migratory status will not hinder the exercise of his or her 
rights and liberties...Mexico guarantees the personal safety of migrants, regardless of their migratory status” 
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include it with the understanding that the narratives it describes might not fully represent Central 
American migrants today to whom my analysis pertains. 
With deepened networks of corruption linking organized crime networks to police and 
government officials, journalism and activist networks have shouldered the responsibility of 
documenting crimes. In Mexico, those who report on human rights abuses risk their lives. 
Human rights journalists are routinely assassinated or simply disappear without a trace.  50
Although some cases are brought to widespread public attention, many more never surface. 
In March 2017, the story of Miroslava Breach made headlines as the third journalist 
assassinated in Mexico that month. Breach, a reporter for the La Jornada and Norte de Juarez 
newspapers, reported on issues of corruption, narco trafficking, and organized crime. She was 
shot eight times while parked outside of her home in Chihuahua with one of her children in the 
vehicle. A note was left behind that read “For being a loudmouth.” To this day, her case remains 
unsolved, state police claiming a lack of information.  The case of Miroslava Breach is not 51
uncommon. Activist media, however, continues despite the risk. Faced with a state unable or 
unwilling to address issues of corruption, drug trafficking, and human rights abuse, a grassroots 
network of journalists, NGOs and civil society organizations are left chronicling the situation and 
bringing abuses to light, providing a modicum of pressure on the system for change. Positive 
change, unfortunately, has been minimal at best.  52
50 ​Human Rights Watch describes the phenomenon of missing and assassinated journalists in Mexico. Additionally, 
the Attorney General of Mexico cites that 104 journalists were killed and 25 were disappeared between 2000 and 
2017. Between January and July of 2017, the NGO Article 19 documented eight cases of journalists killed and one 
disappeared in Mexico. 
51 ​Information regarding the Miroslava Breach case is taken from the BBC. 
52 ​Yearly NGO reports (Human Rights Watch, in particular) on the status of human rights in Mexico reveal minimal 
progress in many respects. For some abuses, rates are on the rise. With respect to migration-specific human rights 
concerns, this is due in part to increasing numbers of migrants in Mexico. 
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But abuses are learned in this way: from the whispers of friends and family, from 
whatever might be unearthed from the ground, from those that leave home and do not return and 
the absence that they leave. In the case of Mexico, the official data on migrant security is but the 
tip of the iceberg, the rot of corruption, undocumented status and its protection gaps, and 
antagonistic state forces combining to suppress information on human rights. This demonstrates 
the complexity of the security situation for migrants travelling through Mexico, caught within a 
web of institutional forces that shape how they move.  
 
 
Insecurity on the Migrant Trail 
 
Perhaps the most visceral display of the insecurity that migrants face in the passage 
through Mexico is death. As with most human rights abuses, concrete estimates in absolute 
numbers of migrants who have died in Mexico are not available, but rough estimates of the 
number in the hundreds per year.  Accounts abound of death and dying along Mexican 53
migratory routes, of cartels stopping a train and murdering dozens or a town wiped off the map 
from violence associated with organized crime.  Many migrants who travel without the aid of a 54
smuggler die in the attempt to cross Mexico on their own, perishing in the sweltering heat of the 
Chihuahuan desert  or falling victim to La Bestia, the infamous train that migrants ride atop of 55
53 ​Data is unknown on the exact number of murders. The Migration Data Portal has registered 510 deaths in 2017.  
54 ​The Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH) reports on the looting and 
burning of Allende by organized crime actors in response to suspected DEA involvement. 
55 Gonzalez (2018) 
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to the U.S. border.  These deaths amount to many more than the systematic killings and 56
combine to make migration through Mexico all the more deadly. 
Assault is a more pervasive and insidious abuse that migrants face in Mexico, affecting 
women disproportionately. Rape and sexual assault are common for women migrants, with 
estimates from Amnesty International finding that up to eight in ten women will become a victim 
over the course of their migration through Mexico.  Perpetrators might be anyone from state or 57
police officials to Mexican citizens taking advantage of migrant vulnerabilities within Mexican 
social and legal structures. Perpetrators understand the particular vulnerabilities of being an 
irregular migrant in Mexico, of what it means to exist outside of the bounds of state protection 
and lack the ability to seek recourse for crimes committed against them. Despite laws that allow 
undocumented individuals in Mexico to seek medical care  and human rights institutions that 58
aim to provide accountability, migrants must weigh the fear of retaliation from perpetrators and 
the desire to continue on to the United States in considerations of whether or not to report. This 
knowledge drives assault and perpetuates systems that turn a blind eye, leaving migrants to be 
assaulted with impunity. Sexual assault is so commonplace that migrant women often leave 
home with the knowledge that assault is a near-inevitability for them, having come to terms with 
what lies in store long before stepping foot onto Mexican soil.  Many go so far as to bring 59
contraception along with them as a health and safety precaution, exemplifying the pervasiveness 
of the practice. 
56 ​For a thorough description of La Bestia and the horrors endured atop it, see Martinez. 
57 ​The Government of Mexico and Amnesty International estimate the frequency of assault of migrant women in 
Mexico to be 6 in 10. Gnam places the estimate at 8 in 10. 
58 ​Article 8 of the 2011 Law of Migration stipulates that “migrants...have the right to receive any type of public and 
private medical care, independent of their migratory status.” 
59 ​Fleury (2016) describes the psychology of sexual abuse in migrant populations in Mexico. 
26 
Oscar Martínez captures this in interviews with migrant women in Chiapas who describe 
their experiences pertaining to assault during migration through Mexico. One woman, a 
transgender Guatemalan named Paola, was stopped by five men from a gang in the mountains of 
La Arrocera, Chiapas and raped by the threat of force. Knowing that resistance was futile and 
that she had no hope for escape, she lied and exclaimed that she was HIV positive, begging her 
attackers to pull out condoms from her bag knowing it might be the only way to protect herself 
against disease transmission.  Martínez cites the practice as commonplace, describing how 60
Paola’s story has been echoed by other migrant women.  61
The impunity that afflicts rape on the migrant trail is echoed in the experiences of 
victims. Interviews with survivors have revealed psychologies of self blame, indifference, and 
lack of agency surrounding their perceptions of their own assault. Few migrant women seek 
medical or legal attention after being raped, many describing their rape as an ugly but 
understandable consequence of the risk they took in migrating.  Some cite the likelihood of a 62
repeat attack as the primary reason for not seeking justice. In the words of one migrant woman, 
“there is just so much road ahead.”  For some women, reporting is not perceived to be the best 63
option if chances are high for a second or even third rape and there is a need to keep going. Such 
stories reveal the lack of agency that migrant women feel in Mexico, losing autonomy not only 
60 ​“Miren, hagan lo que quieran, pero por favor pónganse cóndones. Ahí hay unos en mi mochila, la rojita. Se lo 
recomiendo, porque tengo sida...Es que yo venía preparada, como dicen que siempre le pasa eso a una cuando viene 
migrando.” Martínez 41-42 
61 ​Martínez 
62 ​International Organization for Migration conducted a study of 250 migrant sexual assault survivors in Mexico, 
finding that only 50 sought medical treatment or legal recourse. 
63 This quote comes from an interview published in “Los Migrantes Que No Importan” by Oscar Martínez. 
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over their bodies but understanding implicitly that social and legal structures in Mexico do not 
listen to voices such as theirs.  64
Indeed, the practice is not limited to La Arrocera and the mountains of Chiapas. In Baja 
California, hundreds of miles to the north on the border of California, Martínez reports that there 
exists a tree strung with the underwear of women who have fallen victim to sexual assault, their 
undergarments hung on its branches like trophies by assailants whose crimes have become 
normalized.  The tree stands as a symbol to migrants of the utter powerlessness they exercise 65
over their lives and bodies in Mexico. This pervasiveness and normalization of sexual assault 
against migrants throughout Mexico demonstrates both the severity of their vulnerability and the 
weakness and failure of state institutions in addressing such abuses. 
Although many migrants survive falling victim to violations of personal and bodily 
security in Mexico, others simply disappear without a trace. Families of the disappeared are left 
without closure, no body to bury and no way to know what happened to the person they loved, or 
if they even died in the first place. Some are kidnapped and put up for ransom, then killed if they 
cannot put together enough money to pay.  Others are trafficked. Many more simply die in the 66
harsh conditions of the Mexican terrain: of dehydration, illness, exhaustion.  67
Enforced disappearance refers specifically to an intentional process, that the perpetrator 
hid the body. As with other abuses discussed in this chapter, precise calculations of the number 
64 ​According to Martinez, impunity in La Arrocera exists only for Central Americans. Many Mexican nationals 
report assault to local police forces, but migrants, particularly women, will oftentimes not have their cases heard. 
Although due in part to fears of deportation that discourage undocumented migrants from reporting assault, 
impunity is not experienced evenly in Chiapas, with Central Americans experiencing heightened vulnerability. 
65 ​Martínez 
66 ​Amnesty International describes the process of kidnapping for migrants and the extortion levied against them. 
67 ​Various NGOs publish reports on the dangers of the migrant journey along with the National Human Rights 
Commission. ​Castilla Juárez (2017) writes on the situation as well. These examples are adapted from her work and 
other such reports. 
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of disappeared are impossible, and we cannot always know which numbers refer specifically to 
migrants or to abuses in Mexico in general. No registry exists for them. The National Human 
Rights Commission (CNDH for its Spanish acronym) estimates anywhere between 50,000 and 
500,000 individuals have disappeared in Mexico since its establishment.  The CNDH registers 68
thousands of missing person reports a year in Mexico, but the actual number likely swells much 
higher, as individuals are unlikely to report due to fear of reprisals or a lack of trust in Mexican 
authorities.  Most of the victims these data reflect are Mexican nationals, but this demonstrates 69
the prevalence of the practice. 
In El Salvador, one mother describes the process of coming to terms with her son’s 
disappearance in Mexico as so: 
“Sometimes, I forget what I’m talking about...When they asked me if I knew anything              
about Charli, it was like someone was hitting me from the inside. I knew, I knew for a                  
while...Two years, seven months, and ten days have passed. The bones, well, they would              
bring me a bit of peace, although nothing will bring me complete peace...When there’s a               
heavy rain I imagine that his bones could go in a current and I’ll never find them...Every                 
time that I hear that there’s a storm in Mexico, I think about that. It’s a heavy anguish                  
when I see that others are going to bring flowers to their loved ones, and I’ll never see                  
mine.”  70
Stories such as this mother’s abound. For every disappeared migrant, there are family and friends 
left behind who know nothing. As unidentified bodies pile up in the thousands in Mexican 
68 Citroni writes on the phenomenon of missing and disappeared migrants via the International Committee of the 
Red Cross. 
69 ​ For information on the role of mistrust in authorities in human rights impunity, see ​Martinez. 
70 ​Martinez 313, translated by Blaine Finstein 
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agencies and cemeteries, there exists a network much greater of those impacted by their loss, 
some of whom might never recover or find themselves forever changed. Some families, unable 
to bear the silence and the not knowing, go to Mexico with signs of their loved ones, holding on 
to hope for a bit of information that might bring them peace. Throughout Mexico, caravans of 
mothers and grandmothers hold signs on buses or on street corners. In the middle of Mexico 
City, nestled by the entrance to Chapultepec Park alongside the bustling Reforma, there is a 
monument to dozens of disappeared migrants, their faces carved in metal beneath a placard that 
reads “​Where are our children?​” Such demonstrations hold testament to what has transpired, to 
the existence of the missing, and to a society unwilling to acknowledge its crimes. In the absence 
of governmental accountability, families of the disappeared continue to remember. 
As the number of abuses and the number of the disappeared migrants increases, mass 
graves have been unearthed sporadically across migratory routes.  In 2017, a mass grave was 71
discovered in the state of Veracruz containing 250 skulls. In September of 2018, 168 more were 
found.  Drone technology and other advancements are being utilized to help in the search, but in 72
the meantime there are more mass graves waiting to be discovered across Mexico. Such sites 
reveal the geography of migration and death within the country and serve as proof of crimes 
committed. 
Beyond abuses themselves, however, it is important to emphasize the role that 
socioeconomic status plays in migration through Mexico. Smuggler fees cost, on average, 
anywhere from US$12,000  to $15,000 to smuggle a migrant from the Northern Triangle past 
71 ​Journalism has been particularly effective in chronicling the phenomenon of mass graves. These descriptions in 
particular come from The Washington Post describes. 
72 ​O’Grady (2018) 
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internal border checkpoints in the United States,  with figures only rising under 2018 estimates.73
 For migrants travelling with the aid of a smuggler, payment must be made regularly 74
throughout the journey or risk what may come. In such circumstances, one continues to travel 
without the aid of a smuggler, gambling their lives on their ability to survive on their own and 
risking capture by state authorities who will deport them back to Central America. The reality for 
many, however, is being stuck within the bottleneck of southern or central Mexico, unable to 
move forward and unable to go back due to lack of funds.  75
Even capture by state authorities is an experience shaped by economic privilege for 
migrants in Mexico. Deportation is not a given, but rather a punishment inflicted on those who 
cannot afford to pay off state authorities. Rather than simply deporting every migrant who winds 
up in the hands of National Institute for Migration agents, these officials may offer release for set 
fee. Migrants may be captured multiple times but pay the fee and continue the journey with a 
dent in their funds.  In fact, the practice is so commonplace that by the time migrants make it to 76
northern Mexico, authorities assume that they know the price already.  77
Another constraint on Central American migrants is a “tax” imposed by society itself. For 
undocumented Central Americans in Mexico, the experience of purchasing goods at a store can 
be shaped by nationality. Shopkeepers, drivers, and other Mexicans, knowing that migrants are 
desperate to reach the United States, upcharge for everything from water bottles to public 
73 ​Kulish (2018) 
74 Martinez (2017) 
75 ​Martinez describes this phenomenon to particular effect in his interviews at the Calipso strip club. Kulish (2018) 
chronicles it as well. 
76 ​UNHCR documents this practice as well, citing bribes as a means of escaping deportation. 
77 ​Kulish (2018) documents the case of a Honduran man migrating irregularly through Mexico. This is taken from 
his description of what occurred to him in the process of apprehension and detention in the North of Mexico. 
According to him, the practice is commonplace. 
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transportation.  Over time, these fees accrue, taxing the already limited resources of most 78
migrants who are already vulnerable and insecure. 
Specific instances of migrants being taken advantage of economically are rampant. In 
accompanying Central American migrants in their journey through Mexico in 2009, Oscar 
Martínez describes a strip club named Calipso in the southern state of Chiapas. Almost all of its 
workers are Central American women who began their migration in the hopes of reaching the 
United States before running out of money and ending up involved in sex work. Many of the 
women that Martínez interviews wind up at Calipso by force, their smugglers forcing them into 
survival sex or trafficking them as a means to pay back what they owe. The women, however, 
rarely earn enough to leave and spend their lives in Chiapas, forever in debt and working towards 
a dream that will never be realized.  79
This epitomizes the migration-socioeconomic status nexus in Mexico. The most 
vulnerable migrants, those who lack even enough money or familial support to pay for a 
smuggler, face the brunt of the insecurity and are left in positions of heightened vulnerability 
during their migration. Some choose to continue on despite the dangers, braving the Mexican 
terrain without the knowledge of a smuggler to ensure they do not wind up an unnamed body 
sprawled across the desert. Others are forced to abandon their dreams of reaching the United 
States and spend their lives trapped within Mexico, living undocumented in conditions of 
poverty. Others return home, either by choice or deportation, to the same insecurity that drove 
78 ​Kulish (2018) 
79 ​Martínez (2009) interviews migrant women at the Calipso who describe the role that limited funds played in 
keeping them at the club, rather than continuing their migration. His interviews describe how this lack of resources 
restricts migration more generally, not just at the Calipso. His work epitomizes the relationship between 
socioeconomic status and insecurity in demonstrating how those with fewer financial resources have limited access 
to smugglers, safety, and continuing north. 
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them out in the first place. Some choose to try again at the behemoth of Mexico. Others do not 
and live. Others do not and die. For migrants, everything is a gamble.  
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The Right to Due Process 
 
The second key category of rights for migrants in Mexico is the right to due process. 
While abuses of security threaten migrants’ lives and health, abuses of due process limit their 
ability to access legal protections and restrict their rights in comparison to Mexican nationals. 
Whereas security risks are perpetrated by a number of actors, both state and non-state, due 
process violations are primarily the result of Mexican governmental institutions. As such, they 
constitute an important and concrete area in which Mexican policy can be reformed without 
grappling with the broader institutional issues that shape migrant security. This section discusses 
how migration is affected by due process violations, from apprehension, to case processing and 
detention, to impunity. 
Due process for migrants is complicated by Mexico’s bureaucratic structure. In Mexico, 
rather than a single government agency tasked with all apprehensions and detentions, cases from 
undocumented migrants are handled by three systems. Adults are detained by the National 
Institute of Migration (Instituto Nacional de Migración, INM), whereas unaccompanied minors 
are screened for protection needs and handed over to the National System for Integral Family 
Development (Sistema Nacional para el Desarrollo Integral de la Família, DIF).  Per law, any 80
migrant that requests asylum must have their application forwarded to the Mexican Commission 
for Refugee Assistance (Comisión Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados, COMAR). Asylum seekers 
who request asylum through COMAR before apprehension are not detained while their 
80 ​This system is outlined in the 2011 Law of Migration. For a comprehensive description of its functioning, see 
Human Rights Watch’s 2016 report “Closed Doors” which explains the intricacies of the bureaucracies that handles 
irregular migration and asylum in Mexico. 
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applications are processed, whereas undocumented migrants who ask for asylum after 
apprehension are detained until a decision has been made regarding their migration status.  81
Issues arise in the execution of laws across these units. According to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) office for Central America, Mexico, and Cuba, “the 
biggest problem in Mexico is not the [asylum] procedure itself, but access to the procedure.”  82
Rather than operating as well-structured bureaucracies with uniform regulations, there is a 
breakdown in communication and policy implementation that has resulted in misinformation, 
poor training of state officials, and ultimately, the failure to secure migrants’ legal rights while in 
state custody. 
In 2016, Human Rights Watch released a report on due process for unaccompanied 
Central American minors in Mexico. Field work from across detention centers, INM and DIF 
offices, and albergues revealed reports of widespread mistreatment and misinformation.  83
Migrants are frequently misinformed of their rights, and many are not told that they are able to 
seek refugee status. This problem is compounded for unaccompanied minors who must be 
informed of their rights and have their cases processed in ways that take into account their age 
and its associated vulnerabilities. 
The data is grim. Of the 62 child migrants interviewed by Human Rights Watch, only one 
had spoken with a child protection officer while in INM custody to evaluate protection needs and 
the potential for referral to the DIF.  As such, few children end up filing claims for asylum for 84
81 ​Provisions for the detention of such migrants are laid out in the 2011 Law of Migration. Human Rights Watch 
(2016) documents the practice. 
82 ​This UNHCR quote is taken from Human Rights Watch (2016). 
83 ​Fieldwork done in Mexico, including interviews with officials from COMAR, the DIF, and the INM along with 
unaccompanied migrant children from Central America documents this. 
84 ​Only one of the 62 child migrants interviewed by Human Rights Watch (2016) said that they were informed by 
the INM of their right to apply for asylum. 
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which they might have grounds. In 2014, Mexico granted asylum to only 25 unaccompanied or 
separated children, representing only .3% of the INM’s total apprehensions of child migrants that 
year, that number rising to a mere 52 in 2015.  Numbers have risen in recent years, with 1% of 85
apprehended child migrants receiving protection in 2017  and 7% of applications resulting in 86
refugee status in 2018,  but the number continues to fall much below the total estimated need. 87
UNHCR calculates the number of child migrants in Mexican custody qualifying for protection 
under refugee status or asylum to be about half of the total apprehended.  88
Furthermore, even when migrants are informed of the right to seek refugee status, they 
are often told that choosing to apply for it will result in increased stays in detention or that their 
applications will not be successful. Immigration officials frequently fail to ask more than a 
cursory set of questions in refugee status interviews, then deport potential asylees for failure to 
demonstrate grounds for protection. The misinformation and poor policy implementation 
prevalent throughout the migration processing or refugee status processes represent a significant 
barrier to due process and does an injustice to migrants in Mexico, ensuring that many fall 
between the cracks. 
After apprehension, migrants move on to detention.  Although the detention experience 89
is individual and varies, reports exist of migrants being kept in detention centers for as long as a 
year while waiting for their refugee status cases to be processed.  For reference, Mexican law 90
85 ​Human Rights Watch (2016) 
86 ​Human Rights Watch World Report 2019: Mexico 
87 ​This data comes directly from Mexico’s Refugee Commission (COMAR). Out of 17,116 applications, 1,327 
resulted in refugee status. 
88 ​UNHCR via Human Rights Watch 
89 ​As mentioned previously, not all migrants are detained while their cases are processed. Those who apply directly 
with COMAR and unaccompanied children whose cases have been moved to the DIF are not held in detention and 
are therefore not covered within this discussion. 
90 ​Human Rights Watch (2016) documents this phenomenon. 
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outlines a maximal detention stay of 15 days, except under particular circumstances resulting in 
no more than 60 days total in custody.  This is in stark contrast to the reality of detention for 91
apprehended undocumented migrants who face protracted stays. There has been significant 
improvement in detention length since 2016, particularly in southern Mexico which faces greater 
Central American migration flows. The average length of detention has fallen to a week as of 
early 2018,  but migrants continue to face issues beyond the length of detention, particularly in 92
the north. 
In addition, conditions in which migrants are kept frequently fail to comply with law.  93
Cases have surfaced of detention centers starving migrants as a means of discouraging asylum 
applications and deportation back to Central America.  The INM Citizen Council released a 94
report in 2017 of detention conditions in Mexico based on interview data, citing numerous 
abuses throughout the process of apprehension, detention, migratory or refugee status case 
processing, and deportation. INM officials used physical force to encourage deportation,  none 95
of the migrants interviewed had knowledge of how to lodge a complaint of abuse,  none were 96
informed of their right to legal representation or means of regularization.  While in detention, 97
91 ​The 2011 Law of Migration outlines 15 work days as the maximum stay in detention, except in cases in which 
documentation is difficult to obtain due to communication issues with foreign governments. Detention should never, 
however, exceed 60 days per Mexican law. 
92 ​The Mexico Security Initiative at the Strauss Center found that detention stays average a week in Mexico. 
Refugee status processing, however, continues to lengthen the stay significantly. 
93 ​Current information on detention practices is difficult to obtain. Mexico is not often open with researchers about 
the conditions of its detention facilities. Human Rights Watch (2016) offers a look into Mexican detention, although 
conditions change frequently. As such, there is likely a difference in the conditions they describe versus the state of 
detention today. For a look at detention in 2008, before the 2011 Law of Migration, see the Migration Policy 
Institute (2008). 
94 ​Human Rights Watch (2016) documents this. 
95 ​Finding 23 of the Executive Summary says that “cases were registered of the use of force to obligate individuals 
to accept orders of deportation.” Translated by Blaine Finstein. 
96 ​Finding 29 says that “none of those interviewed knew how to file a complaint [against INM].” Translated by 
Blaine Finstein. 
97 ​Findings 51 and 52 say that “those interviewed were not informed of their right to legal defense…[or] their 
options for regularization.” Translated by Blaine Finstein. 
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No detention center provided separate accommodations for LGBT individuals or families, many 
lacked beds, and solitary confinement was frequently used as a means of “providing safety” for 
vulnerable individuals (notably LGBT detainees), a violation of international law.  Such abuses 98
constitute significant violations of due process that must be addressed in ensuring the full 
enjoyment of human rights throughout the entirety of a migrant’s journey. 
In addition to failures within Mexico’s immigration agencies to implement policy 
effectively, impunity for perpetrators looms as a fundamental structural issue blocking migrants’ 
access to due process. Although Mexican law provides equal protection for all migrants 
regardless of regular or irregular status,  judicial institutions in the country rarely guarantee its 99
application. Exemplified by the case of sexual assault of migrant women in Chiapas, municipal 
police frequently dismiss the minority of cases that are reported by Central Americans.  100
Prejudice against Central Americans in Mexico, particularly migrants, leads their cases to stall 
with minimal investigation. In contrast to the numbers of security violations estimated to occur 
in the journey through Mexico, the National Human Rights Commission has received only 5,294 
reports of such crimes since its creation.  101
In summary, due process violations are common elements of the migrant experience in 
Mexico, shaping both personal security in the form of impunity and interactions with the state. In 
the latter, there is a breakdown as law is translated to policy, stopping migrants, particularly 
unaccompanied children and refugees, from accessing their human rights. Mexico must grapple 
with these issues should it wish to ensure the fair treatment of migrants in its custody and 
98 ​The INM Citizen Council (2017) documents these abuses. 
99 ​Articles 12 and 13 of the 2011 Law of Migration state this. 
100 ​The Washington Office on Latin America (2017) documents this. 
101 Washington Office on Latin America (2017) 
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provide judicial recourse for crimes committed against them in order to reduce the prevalence of 
violence and insecurity for migrants.  
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Refugee and Asylum Rights 
 
In addition to the rights to security and due process, the third and final protection gap is 
refugee and asylum rights. It is important to note that in contrast to the earlier two categories of 
rights that pertain to all migrants indiscriminately, refugee and asylum rights apply only to a 
particular subset of migrants. As such, defining the boundaries that divide migrants along these 
categories is important in understanding to whom this analysis applies and for what reasons. 
As described earlier in my discussion, separate legal structures exist to address the 
concerns of refugees and forced migrants following the Second World War.  Europe was faced 102
with millions of migrants travelling in various ways over the continent in response to crisis and 
changing borders. The United Nations and the newly designed international institutional 
structure it heads sought to develop policy that could handle such a crisis and any others that 
might arise in the future.  103
The definition of the refugee developed in response to this particular context. As opposed 
to migrants, which encompasses all individuals who have crossed an international border,  104
refugees are migrants who were forced to flee due to a well-founded fear of persecution.  The 105
102 ​The introductory note of the 1951 Refugee Convention by Antonio Guterres, the 10th High Commissioner for 
Refugees of the United Nations, discusses the origins of the Convention. Gatrell and Price, M. E. (2006) discuss this 
as well, paying particular attention to the historical factors that shaped the emergence of the Convention. 
103 ​Gatrell (2013) 
104 ​The definition of a migrant varies. My discussion draws on the legal definition pertaining to Mexican law given 
in Article 3 of the Law of Migration (2011), which defines such an individual as “someone who leaves, transits 
through, or arrives to the territory of a state distinct from that of their residence for any motivation.” Translated by 
Blaine Finstein. 
105 ​Article 1 of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951) defines a refugee as someone who, 
“owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, national-ity, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion, is out-side the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.” 
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1951 Refugee Convention parses this definition into five categories of persecution, on the basis 
of: race, religion, nationality, membership to a particular social group, and political opinion.  106
Migration scholars such as Peter Gatrell and Andrew Shacknove note the restrictions 
inherent in such a narrow definition of persecution and refugeehood more generally, developing 
a broader term that applies to migrants who flee under similar conditions of duress not covered 
by the convention: forced migrants. Forced migration is not mentioned in Mexican law but offers 
an important distinction that recognizes the diversity of push factors that can force an individual 
to leave their country of residence in search of international protection. The term is particularly 
apt in the North American context, in which migrants flee for a variety of reasons: gang violence 
and recruitment, hunger and abject poverty, gender and sexual violence. Not all of these reasons 
make the migrant a refugee, but all force a migrant out in search of a home that allows them the 
enjoyment of their full human rights. As such, I incorporate the term in my discussion. 
North America does not have a uniform system of handling refugee protections and it is 
important to clarify the differences before moving further. Asylum, although rooted in 
definitions of refugeehood, is a particular instantiation of refugee protections. Asylum seekers 
arrive at or within a foreign state and then ask for legal protection. Each state defines the bounds 
of asylum for itself with respect to who and how many may receive it. In the context of Mexico, 
however, asylum is referred to as “refugee status.”  
Globally,as soon as a migrant crosses an international border due to a well-founded fear 
of persecution,  they are a refugee. International refugee protections are grounded in the 107
principle of non-refoulement. Non-refoulement, outlined in the introductory note of the 1951 
106 ​Article 1 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
107 ​Again, the legal definition of persecution applies only to particular groups of people and not all forced migrants. 
As such, it does not apply to all Central American migrants in Mexico. 
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Convention on the Status of refugees as one of its guiding principles, prevents a state from 
returning a refugee to a condition in which they can experience persecution like that which drove 
them to flee in the first place.  108
These protections, however, have not been upheld in Mexico. Requirements within the 
international and domestic law outline refugee rights in Mexico, from detention, to information 
regarding their rights, to protection from non-refoulement, among others. In the remainder of this 
section, I elaborate what rights in particular are not upheld and explore why that is the case via 
“securitization” policy. 
As mentioned in my discussion of due process, detention conditions during the 
processing of refugee status claims frequently fail to comply with law. Requirements within the 
2011 Law of Migration and Law of Refugees, Complementary Protection, and Political Asylum 
outline requirements for the maximum length of time in detention and conditions for legal 
deportation. However, amidst case backlog, asylum applications continue to rise, clogging 
resource-strained immigration courts and protracting detention stays well beyond the 60-day 
maximum.  109
Underfunding intensifies this problem. From 2013 to 2017, COMAR received no 
increase in funding despite vast increases in the number of asylum applications received. As of 
2017, there were only 15 full-time officials within the agency capable of making refugee status 
108 ​For a comprehensive discussion of the principle of non-refoulement, see the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (2018). 
109 ​The Government of Mexico documents yearly statistics on the status of asylum applications. Data are broken 
down by nationality and include the number of successful, unsuccessful, and incomplete cases. The data note a sharp 
increase in the number of pending applications since 2014, coinciding with the uptake in migration from Central 
America. This is evidence of the case backlog in the Mexican asylum system. 
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determinations.  Such inadequacies ensure that COMAR is incapable of processing even the 110
comparatively minimal cases that are filed for asylum in a manner compliant with refugee law. 
As case backlog increases in Mexico, many refugees with legal claims to protection agree 
to be deported back to Central America rather than wait out what might amount to months of 
detention while their cases are processed, violating non-refoulement and resulting in many 
migrants with valid claims to refugee status not receiving it. As such, Mexico’s policy of 
deportation in the absence of due process marks a particularly sharp protection gap for its 
refugees. 
 
 
The “Securitization” Phenomenon 
 
As opposed to a forced migration crisis, modern migration from Central America has 
predominantly been treated as a security concern for the United States and Mexico. Although 
international refugee and human rights law is grounded in the principle of human security, 
Mexico and the United States use national security as justification for the failure to provide 
protection. I refer to this phenomenon as “securitization” and demonstrate in this section the 
impact it has had in Mexico to the detriment of migrant security. I argue that although Mexico 
has its own anti-immigration interests, it functions as a proxy for the United States in minimizing 
the number of migrants who reach its southern border. 
110 ​The Mexico Security Initiative of the Strauss Center for International Security and Law published a report in 
2018 from which this data is taken, titled “The Impact of Securitization on Central American Migrants.” 
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Historically, migration policy has been used by the United States as an extension of 
national security policy. Throughout the Cold War, refugees from communist states such as 
Cuba and Indochina were granted asylum at higher rates. In contrast, Central American migrants, 
even then, were faced with tightly controlled borders and strict oversight of them, complicating 
their decisions to move further.  Instead of offer protection, the intention of refugee policy was 111
to destabilize communist states and further the spread of democracy.  The refugees themselves 112
were secondary to their utility in realizing foreign policy goals. This is in contrast to a 
humanitarian approach to handling refugee crises that preferences assistance and protection 
indiscriminately.  113
The majority of the world is no longer teetering on the edge of communism, yet bias 
remains in the selection of particular nationalities to allow in disproportionately. Migration 
policy continues to play out in North America as an extension of national security. Today, 
migration is entangled in security issues like the domestic drug trade, gang violence, and 
instability.  As such, Central American forced migrants are seen to personify these policy 114
concerns. Rather than being understood as individual victims of persecution fleeing across 
international borders to seek protection, Central American forced migrants are stigmatized as a 
group, labelled a security threat, and accordingly denied access to most protections.  115
Mexico, caught beneath the political pressure of its northern neighbor alongside its own 
anti-immigrant sentiments, operates in part as a tool for U.S. security interests that seek to 
minimize the number of migrants who make it to the U.S./Mexico border. Mexico’s Southern 
111 Keely 311-12 
112 Keely 307 
113 Keely 307-8 
114 Council on Foreign Relations 2018 
115 Council on Foreign Relations 2018 
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Border Plan, initiated in 2014, placed militarization and deportation at the forefront of the 
country’s migration strategy along the Chiapas/Guatemala border, mimicking the function of the 
U.S./Mexico border as a filter keeping migrants out even before they reach U.S. soil.  Before 116
the election of Mexico’s newest president in July of 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, his 
proposed migration policy was relatively liberal, placing migration and human rights concerns at 
the forefront and including temporary work visas to Central Americans within its proposals. 
Shortly after his election, however, talk of such policies ceased. Similarly, the United States goes 
so far as to lobby the governments of Central America to implement migration policy that favors 
its security interests. These political pressures demonstrate the role of securitization in shaping 
migration policy and work in tandem to ensure that forced migrants rarely find the protections 
they seek in Mexico. 
  
116 ​Vega (2017) and Isacson, Meyer, and Smith (2017) write on the securitization of the southern border and U.S. 
influence in security policy. They draw links between pressure from the United States and the policies that constitute 
the Southern Border Program, with increases in apprehensions and deportations, in particular. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
Central American migrants are subject to many abuses while they journey through 
Mexico, including violations of their rights to security, due process, and refugee protections. 
Amidst kidnapping, enforced disappearance, assault, extortion, and protection gaps while in state 
custody, it is clear that the legal provisions for migrants are not being upheld in Mexico. These 
abuses are exacerbated by corruption, underfunding, poor policy implementation on behalf of the 
INM, and securitization. Economic pressures and policy failures often end in deportation. 
Although many migrants see Mexico as merely a stepping stone to the United States and 
do not wish to stay, the vast protection gaps that they experience within it are a stark denial of 
their human rights. Policy must move away from securitization and treat migration from Central 
America as what it is: a crisis of forced migration with human rights law that must be applied.  
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Chapter 4 - For every country I lose I make another 
Policy 
 
 
As discussed in the previous chapters, migrants face a crisis of human rights within 
Mexico. What remains to be discussed, however, is how the state might grapple with these 
issues. Throughout the course of this chapter, I address these questions by raising policy options 
to combat violations of security, due process, and refugee and asylum rights. In addition, I offer 
arguments for their implementation in comparison to securitization. I end by outlining a vision 
for how human rights policy can work in tandem with state interests and benefit more than just 
migrants, but Mexico as a whole. 
It is important to note that I do not offer solutions to all of the human rights issues that 
migrants face in Mexico. As demonstrated, these issues are widespread and deeply rooted in both 
governmental and social institutions. ​Various reasons exist for both why and how migrants' 
human rights are violated in Mexico, and the interplay between them makes using policy to 
target or affect a single issue almost impossible. This tangled knot of rights violations and 
institutional failings means that while I cannot address all of them within the scope of this work, 
my analysis will bear in mind existing linkages between them.​ ​Furthermore, it is impossible to 
reduce the rate of occurrence of human rights abuses to zero. I do not labor under the delusion 
that policy can entirely counteract every rights violation that could occur against a migrant in 
Mexico. 
That being said, substantive policy options exist that the Mexican government can and 
should implement that have the potential to improve the human rights situation for migrants. I 
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begin by advocating for a non-traditional regularization of migration via the end of detention 
practices. Afterwards, I address the need for budgetary increases and judicial reform that would 
work in tandem with migration regularization to ensure that migrants’ rights to security, due 
process, and refugee protections are upheld. Finally, I move into a discussion of how human 
rights policy might be mutually beneficial for both migrants and the state, in contrast to 
securitization. 
 
 
Regularizing Migration: Dropping Detention 
 
As outlined in the previous chapter, security issues constitute many of the abuses that 
migrants face while journeying through Mexico. To reiterate core issues of migrant security, the 
majority of the risk is inherent in the routes that migrants are forced onto. Undocumented 
migrants in Mexico must avoid state detection and thereby move through unsafe channels that 
incur large security risks. Murder, assault, torture, and kidnapping are all heightened 
significantly under irregular migration resulting in large numbers of abuses that go largely 
unreported or unprosecuted. Under the protection of a reputable smuggler, much of this is 
avoided, but large protection gaps remain, particularly for the most vulnerable migrants who lack 
the capital to purchase such services. The key in addressing human rights and personal security, 
then, is to regularize migration through Mexico. 
To regularize migration is to make migration legal rather than illegal. Presently, the 
majority of migrants in Mexico traverse the country undocumented, but as individuals with a 
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lawful presence in Mexico, they would be able to move through the country quickly along safe 
routes that do not require a smuggler. This would allow migrants to make it from the border in 
Chiapas to the United States in a matter of days. Migration through the country could be as 
simple as taking a bus. 
Such a policy would address nearly every aspect of insecurity in the journey through 
Mexico, minimizing the risk of commonplace abuses without having to address broader 
structural issues of organized crime, drug smuggling operations, and corruption that heighten 
them. As such, the regularization of migration is a way to address migrant security that works 
particularly well in the context of Mexico, where structural issues are deeply rooted to the extent 
that they have proven nearly impossible to reform.  This turns the black market of migrant and 117
drug smuggling operations on its head, uprooting the operations of organized crime networks and 
weakening the links that tether corruption to Mexican governance. 
However, regularizing migration is not as simple as changing the migration law. 
Domestic institutions and Mexican society are not always friendly towards Central Americans, 
with prejudice acting as friction against migration and free movement.  Citizens are likely to 118
respond negatively to open borders that allow an influx of migrants who would be seen as an 
unwelcome resource drain on an already taxed society. Similarly, the United States is not apt to 
respond favorably to these migration policies. As discussed previously, the United States 
government exerts diplomatic pressure on Mexico and Central America to implement 
securitization policy that discourages immigrants from reaching its southern border. This 
includes providing some funding for Mexico’s 2014 Southern Border Program, which centered 
117 ​I make this claim on the basis of the prevalence of structural issues such as corruption, organized crime, and 
impunity. This has been documented earlier in the paper and is reflected in much of the scholarship that I cite. 
118 ​For a look at the racial and ethnic tension between migrants and police, see Martinez. 
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around increased apprehensions to catch undocumented migrants before they made it farther 
north.  The United States is likely to discontinue to allocate funds to such programs should 119
Mexico regularize migration, burdening Mexico with economic costs and potential reductions in 
the aid upon which it relies. 
How, then, might Mexico offer legal migration for the sake of the well-being of migrants 
while avoiding the unwanted consequences of international diplomatic sanctions and social 
unrest? Programs that attempt these goals have been proposed, notably by president Andrés 
Manuel López Obrador in his policy propositions for MORENA, the party he both founded and 
leads, in a plan to offer temporary work visas to Central Americans.  Unfortunately, such 120
policy has yet to come fruition in the initial months of his presidency and administration has 
begun to limit talks of temporary work visas to the southern border states. However, migration 
regularization remains within the realm of possibility as a way to offer both protection to those 
who wish to remain in Mexico and a legal means of traversing the country legally for those who 
are set to migrate to the United States regardless. 
There exist other ways to allow for regular migration through Mexico beyond temporary 
work visas. I argue that Mexico should do so by abolishing the practice of detention for migrants 
who apply for refugee status. This would serve the dual purpose of offering a means of regular 
migration through the country while ending abuses associated with the detention process. 
119 ​Vega (2017) and Isacson, Meyer, and Smith (2017) write on the securitization of the southern border and U.S. 
influence in security policy. They draw links between pressure from the United States and the policies that constitute 
the Southern Border Program, with increases in apprehensions and deportations, in particular. 
120 ​See “MORENA’s National Project: 2018-2024” for a comprehensive description of policy proposals the party 
supported before Lopez Obrador took office. Temporary work visas for Central Americans are included, along with 
a number of other progressive migration policies that seek to center the crisis. 
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Furthermore, I argue that abolishing detention is diplomatically feasible on the grounds of human 
rights. 
Detention serves the primarily to prevent migrants from living undocumented without 
successfully completing refugee status procedure that verifies their protection needs. Detention, 
then, ensures that those who do not qualify cannot remain and are within state custody for ease of 
deportation should their application be denied. In the case of Mexico, however, the majority of 
undocumented migrants seek to continue their migration to the United States. Detention 
primarily serves U.S. security rather than domestic interests, catching migrants in Mexico and 
preventing their migration as early as possible. Should detention be abolished within Mexico, or 
at least limited to minimal cases, some migrants would use the opportunity as a means for 
continuing north. However, as refugee status seekers with lawful presence, these migrants would 
be able to move without restriction in Mexico and could make it to the United States quickly and 
safely. They would not be forced to move under conditions of insecurity that plague irregular 
migration and incur the majority of the risk. 
Under present policy, not all refugee status seekers are detained while their case is 
processed. Refugee status seekers who go directly to COMAR are allowed free movement,  121
whereas those who seek refugee status after being apprehended by INM are kept in detention. 
The latter represent the majority of those who migrate through Mexico in the hopes of reaching 
the United States and thereby the population most susceptible to violations of their human rights. 
Despite many being refugees with legal claims to protection, their desire to continue on to the 
121 ​COMAR requires that such applicants visit their offices weekly, which is indeed a restriction on movement. 
Some refugee status seekers who apply above Mexico City (where the northernmost COMAR office is) are required 
to stay within the state in which they applied. 
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United States forces them into insecurity in Mexico that heightens their risk of human rights 
abuse. 
Furthermore, as evidenced by my discussion of the right to due process, detention is 
associated with a number of human rights abuses. Per human rights law, detention must not be 
protracted and migrants are allowed access to minimum conditions. Under conditions of 
underfunding and case backlog, these rights are difficult to ensure. Eliminating the practice of 
detention would avoid such abuses while cutting costs. 
I argue that ending the practice of detention is a way to offer a legal pathway to migration 
through Mexico in a manner that is both diplomatically advantageous for Mexico and serves dual 
human rights goals of due process and security. In terms of diplomacy, ending detention for 
refugee status seekers is not a measure that overtly regularizes migration to the U.S. border. Even 
if the United States reacts poorly, it is keeping in line with Mexico’s human rights goals. As 
such, ending detention offers Mexico a means of improving the human rights situation for its 
migrants in a way that minimizes political consequences while lessening the drain on its 
resources. 
 
 
Refugee Status Reform and Funding Increases 
 
Ending the practice of detention for apprehended refugee status seekers in isolation 
would not function as a means of migration regularization through Mexico if the majority of 
those apprehended cannot access refugee status procedures. As demonstrated by the work of 
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Human Rights Watch and the INM Citizen Council in evaluating the Mexican apprehension and 
detention system, refugee status itself is not the issue, but rather the lack of access to it. Few 
migrants receive refugee status, with state officials misinforming them of their legal rights and 
refugee status interviews failing to capture the extent of their protection needs. This is 
exacerbated for unaccompanied minors who constitute a significant portion of those passing 
through Mexico due to reasons such as being targeted for gang recruitment in Central America or 
sexual and gender-based violence.  122
In light of these concerns, Mexico should expand refugee processing programs to screen 
migrants effectively for protection needs, addressing the right to refugee status procedure. 
Mexico should do this by implementing policy that reforms the refugee status process via 
superior training of INM officials that handle initial protection screening and superior training of 
COMAR officials who conduct interviews for refugee status. Migrants must be informed of their 
rights, provided translation services in their native language, and allowed a refugee status 
interview that is sufficient to gauge their needs.  Unaccompanied child migrants must be treated 123
in a manner compliant with the 2011 Law of Migration that recognizes their unique needs. These 
measures would end the system of closed doors that prevents migrants from accessing the 
international protection guaranteed to them and ensure that all those with valid claims to 
protection receive it. 
122 ​The INM cites that 80,000 unaccompanied minors were apprehended in Mexico from 2009 to 2018, though the 
number likely swells higher than official data. 
123 ​According to the Mexico Security Initiative of the Strauss Center for International Security and Law, translation 
services are generally provided only in English and French. Many Central American migrants, particularly from 
Guatemala, speak indigenous languages. Language serves as a barrier in their interactions with INM and COMAR 
officials, with migrants frequently translating for other migrants. The Mexico Security Initiative also found that 
refugee status interviews were frequently conducted briefly over the phone. 
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These issues compound amidst underfunding of COMAR and poor training of INM 
officials to result in few migrants receiving the protection they need. As discussed pertaining to 
refugee and asylum rights, COMAR has received negligible funding increases since 2012 despite 
vast increases in refugee status applications.  This has left many refugee status cases in limbo 124
for up to a year without an answer. If refugee status is to be accessible in Mexico, funding must 
be allocated to COMAR that corresponds to its workload and recognizes the resource strain of 
processing exponentially increasing refugee status claims. 
Taken together, these policies would make existing protections accessible to refugees in 
Mexico. Superior training of INM and COMAR officials would identify those with protection 
needs and ensure that refugees have access to refugee status procedure, while funding increases 
would provide the necessary resources for COMAR to process applications in the time required 
by law.  125
 
 
Judicial Reform 
 
I advocate for the reform of the human rights judicial system to begin to tackle structural 
impunity. The design of the judicial institutions that preside over cases of human rights abuse in 
124 ​According to COMAR, 2,137 applications for refugee status were filed in 2014. This number jumped to 14,596 
in 2017 and just below 30,000 in 2018. The number of refugee status applications is expected to rise to well over 
40,000 for 2019 based on trends from the initial months of 2019 as well as reports by Mexico Security Initiative of 
the Strauss Center for International Security and Law. 
125 ​As mentioned previously, the 2011 Law of Migration specifies that detention should not exceed 15 business 
days. 60 business days are allowed in cases that require information from foreign embassies that is difficult to 
obtain. According to the Mexico Security Initiative of the Strauss Center for International Security and Law, the 
average length of detention was at 6-7 days as of 2018, but in the case of refugee status, applicants might find 
themselves in detention for months or even a year. 
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Mexico contributes to the impunity that fuels both insecurity in migration and the failure to 
provide legal recourse for such crimes. Although embedded in networks of corruption that link 
organized crime to the state, I argue that impunity can be addressed by extensive judicial reform 
that preferences the punitive and prosecutorial power of human rights on a federal level. 
Impunity for crimes committed against migrants has its roots in the way in which human 
rights is structured judicially in Mexico. Human rights complaints are separate from legal cases 
and not seen within the Mexican court system, instead given as “claims” to the National Human 
Rights Commission (Comisión Nacional de los Derechos Humanos, CNDH). The CNDH, 
however, lacks the power to enforce punitive measures on the perpetrators of abuses.  Instead, 126
after receiving evidence, it meets as a committee and makes a determination on whether or not 
an abuse occurred. If so, “recommendations” are offered that outline what it deems fit as 
recourse and recompense. 
The process is arduous. Claimants must prove that an abuse occurred, bringing trauma to 
the surface, often under conditions of minimal legal resources to develop a case. Should a claim 
be successful and the CNDH determine that an abuse did indeed occur, there is no measure that 
ensures its recommendations are followed. Successful claims frequently stall for decades with 
minimal or no recommendations implemented.  127
This constitutes a significant disincentive for reporting and implies that Mexico does not 
care about human rights, or at least not enough to give them the power to be enforced. Rights are 
only as powerful as their capacity to be guaranteed, which relies upon judicial structures to 
126 ​The Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (2018) describes the impunity of human 
rights violations in Mexico. 
127 ​The research of the Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights documents this. Data on 
the status of CNDH claims, including the extent to which their recommendations have been followed in subsequent 
case reports, is also available on the website of the National Human Rights Commission. 
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criminalize them. Without judicial measures to grant credence to human rights, they flounder in a 
state of semi-existence, somewhat there and somewhat not, están pero no están. 
If Mexico is to improve the human rights record for migrants, it must integrate the CNDH 
within the rest of the legal architecture. Rather than existing as a committee outside of the 
judicial system, complaints should be filed as cases. Rather than recommendations, verdicts 
should be given that result in punitive measures should the crime be deemed to have occurred. 
Perpetrators should receive appropriate sentencing that mirrors what they would receive in a 
state level court rather than a reprimand. 
Additionally, language should be standardized between human rights courts and other 
domestic courts. Although a seemingly minor distinction, incorporating lighter language that 
lessens the psychological impact makes human rights abuses seem as though they are not crimes. 
Language should encourage equality before the law and give the impression that human rights 
abuses will be taken seriously and that their cases will carry judicial weight. 
That being said, the CNDH only presides over cases on a federal level. Human rights 
abuses are predominantly reported to state or local fiscalias. As such, granting prosecutorial 
authority to the CNDH and restructuring it as a court would only provide accountability for 
crimes committed by state authorities. Reforms of the CNDH are a necessary start but would not 
address the entirety of structural impunity for human rights abuses in Mexico. Furthermore, one 
of the key barriers that prevents human rights cases from being reported to state fiscalias is the 
fear of retaliation from perpetrators. Mistrust of authorities only intensifies these concerns as 
abuses themselves have been committed by state authorities. I recognize this as a gap in my 
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recommendations that must be addressed if structural impunity is to be weakened and 
accountability provided for all abuses that migrants face. 
 
 
 
Migration and the State: Mutual Benefits and the Myth of “Securitization” 
 
Migrant rights policy does not solely benefit migrants themselves. I argue that human 
rights policy can be implemented in ways that benefit the security and economic agendas of the 
state. As security and impunity improve for migrants, they also do for Mexican citizens. More 
generally, as the institutional factors that heighten insecurity for migrants are weakened, so they 
are for Mexico itself. Furthermore, refugee integration has the capacity to be an economic force 
for Mexico. As such, the policy options I outline are more than humanitarian, but a vision for 
how human rights for migrants might work in the benefit of the state and society. 
Human rights-oriented policy for migrants should be utilized as a means by which to 
address Mexico’s structural issues. Compliance with human rights law need not be a sacrifice 
that the state must make for the purposes of protecting non-citizens; it is a necessary measure for 
its own security, both at the level of the state in combating organized crime and at the level of the 
individual in improving personal security and the capacity to seek recourse for abuses that are 
committed. 
The regularization of migration offers benefits beyond human rights protections. As 
migrant smuggling operations are enmeshed in drug trafficking with organized criminal groups 
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in ultimate control of movement over the country, removing migrants from their control would 
implicitly reduce their power within Mexico. Migrant smuggling provides significant profits for 
organized criminal groups, with estimates of its worth at $7.4 billion in 2018 according to the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.  Eliminating this income source would be a 128
significant cost to illicit markets and would reduce their power accordingly 
I argue that Mexico need not decide between preferencing either human rights or its 
internal security concerns as policy discussions have been framed in the context of migration 
from Central America. The two can be addressed in tandem. The regularization of migration 
exemplifies this dynamic, with improvements in migrant security weakening organized criminal 
groups and thereby bringing stability to Mexico. Because so many of the issues that afflict 
migrants are the same as those that cause domestic insecurity, minimizing their influence on 
migrants ensures improvements for Mexico as a whole. 
With respect to judicial reform, discouraging the impunity that afflicts cases of rights 
violations against migrants would reduce impunity more generally. Reforms within the CNDH 
do not solely benefit migrants, but the entirety of Mexican society. Human rights abuses are 
perpetrated in Mexico against many more victims than just migrants. Mexicans themselves who 
have suffered crimes of kidnapping, torture, enforced disappearance, and assassination number in 
the hundreds of thousands,  yet justice is similarly infrequent. Victims of crimes perpetrated by 129
Mexican authorities must work through the same legal system via the CNDH and face similarly 
128 ​The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) publishes a yearly report on the state of human 
smuggling from which this data is taken. It cites the average cost of smuggling from Central America via land route 
to be $4,000 to $15,000 and the cost from Mexico to be an average of $5,000. The estimate includes all smuggling 
over the U.S./Mexico border in the year 2018. 
129 ​The Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights documents these data in a number of 
reports on extrajudicial killing, torture, enforced disappearance, and impunity. Data comes from state fiscalias and 
the National Human Rights Commission. 
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bleak prospects for their case being taken seriously and resulting in significant punitive action. 
As such, reforms of the human rights system are necessary not only for migrants, but for Mexico 
more generally. Furthermore, they represent another way in which policy addressing the 
concerns of migrants can work together with domestic interests. 
Additionally, integration programs that encourage migrants’ labor force participation in 
Mexico offer yet greater mutual benefits between migrants and the state. Although rhetoric often 
represents migrants as a disruptive force with the capacity to upend society --and indeed 130
migration inflows often correlate with social unrest --their entry into and protection within 131
foreign states need not cause unrest. Migrants and refugees are not powerless beings who can 
receive only protection and contribute nothing. Each arrives with individual skills and workforce 
capabilities that have the power to improve the economy and society of a host country should 
integration be facilitated smoothly and effectively. 
As such, I advocate for expanded integration programs that work to welcome refugee 
status seekers into Mexican society while filling holes in the Mexican labor force via work 
programs that allow them to enter into relationships of mutual benefit with the state. Integration 
programs already exist for returned migrants from the United States, offering social services that 
address the concerns of a population distanced from Mexican society while recognizing their 
economic potential.  Mexico’s return migration policy matches return migrants and deportees 132
130 ​See: Trump’s 2018 and 2019 State of the Union addresses with discussion of migrants of Latin American origin 
as criminals who bring gang violence and further insecurity in the country 
131 ​Huysmans and Squire (2009) write on the link between migration flows and security, describing this correlation. 
Countless examples exist anecdotally, including the reactions of Mexican and U.S. society in response to Central 
American migrant inflows. 
132 ​The “Somos Mexicanos” program by the Mexican government tackles the integration of return migrants from the 
United States. Its rhetoric describes return migration as a ‘welcome home,’ encouraging returnees to think of 
Mexico in this way. Programs like “Somos Mexicanos” exemplify the dual approach the Mexican government takes 
to migration. In contrast, Central American asylees receive minimal re-integration services. 
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with contacts to help facilitate integration. It partners with various government agencies to 
provide social services, including the Secretary of Health and the Secretary of Education, the 
latter offering education incentives.  Such a program does not exist for refugees on a 133
governmental level, although the work of NGOs address some of their integration concerns. This 
constitutes a failure on the part of the government to recognize the potential of all of its migrants. 
Such policy reveals the faults in the perception of migrant aid as taking away from Mexican 
nationals, as though security and stability are zero sum games with a quantifiable allotment to go 
around. They are reciprocal. The two can and should work in tandem. 
 
 
Limitations 
 
A number of limitations have prevented me from providing an accurate description of the 
human rights situation for migrants in Mexico with important policy implications. Primarily, the 
information may not exist. As discussed throughout this paper, human rights abuses are rarely 
documented due to fear of authorities, design and governance issues within Mexican human 
rights institutions themselves, and the corruption prevalent in the Mexican government. When 
these records do exist, such information is difficult to obtain. Scholars and NGOs frequently 
petition the Mexican government for information on abuses via the National Platform of 
Transparency (Plataforma Nacional de Transparencia, PNT), a process guaranteed by law under 
transparency requests. This system provides information access and transparency in theory, but 
133 ​This information comes from the “Repatriation Program” page of the official website of the National Institute for 
Migration. 
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in many instances, the respective government agencies themselves may not even have the 
relevant information or compile it in a standardized way. 
The National Human Rights Commission publishes reports of every claim along with 
their recommendations, but these represent only a fraction of the total number of abuses. 
Furthermore, the process of reporting and documenting human rights abuses in Mexico is 
lengthy. Cases must move through a vast bureaucratic system and government data collection 
takes time. But in the changing dynamics of migration through Mexico, reports become outdated 
almost as soon as they come to light. These limitations in information collection leave those who 
research human rights in Mexico grasping for ground to stand on and working within a 
significantly restricted scope with respect to what cannot be known. As such, a more complete 
picture of human rights abuses in Mexico must be strung together via the accounts that we have. 
As such, my policy recommendations have been made under conditions of limited 
knowledge that restricts their efficacy. Assessing policy is difficult enough without working 
within conditions of restricted information. Policy is only as good as the accuracy of the 
information it is based on. As such, these recommendations must be considered with the 
knowledge that they might fail to address the extent of the human rights context for migrants in 
Mexico or particular concerns not known by the data available. 
Furthermore, it is important to state that the policy options I outline are those that I 
consider best for implementation by the government of Mexico. Numerous NGOs have 
published reports on best practices for handling the human rights crisis for migrants in Mexico, 
but few take into account their feasibility in practice.  Mexico must contend with a number of 134
134 ​Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have 
done a variety of work on the status of human rights and migrant rights in Mexico. Human Rights Watch, in 
particular, issues yearly reports on the status of human rights in the country, including migrant-specific issues. 
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factors that limit its capacity to create policy in the best interest of human rights, many of which 
I have discussed throughout the course this paper. Policy does not exist in a vacuum, and I do not 
seek to make recommendations without considering Mexico’s present circumstances. If human 
rights workers wish to see their policy goals realized, they must come to grips with the reality of 
state interests and diplomacy and offer solutions that do not assume a perfect world in which 
human rights is always the priority. As such, the policy options I offer are not necessarily the 
best practices for improving human rights for migrants in Mexico, but they are concrete ways to 
maximize such improvements that are possible and even beneficial to the state.   
Domestic NGOs have done a large amount of research and policy recommendations as well. With respect to 
migration through Mexico, look to Sin Fronteras IAP. The Institute for Women in Migration has issued a number of 
reports as well, their focus being gender. For non-migration specific human rights issues, see the work of the 
Mexican Commission for Defense and Promotion of Human Rights (CMDPDH). 
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Chapter 5 - Drowning on dry land 
Concluding Note 
 
 
Migration through Mexico is a phenomenon that occurs under the surface of society. 
Documentation, in a sense, verifies and validates identity, granting worth in the eyes of the state. 
For the migrants who leave Central America in search of home, their undocumented status 
pushes them under the gaze of the Mexican public. Their presence is not acknowledged within its 
communities and the nature of their traumas or histories are not asked. Migrants who complete 
the journey retain a silence surrounding the specifics of their migration, making it to the United 
States and disappearing beneath the fabric of society, existing within the shadows. Mexico, 
however, looms like a giant in the background. 
Those who make it to the United States represent only a fraction of those who leave. For 
every migrant who makes it past the internal border checkpoints or receives asylum, there are 
many more who did not make it. This reality leaves several questions dangling in the background 
of immigration dialogues on the U.S. side of the border: What transpires within these journeys 
that sends them back? What trauma rests so deep that words fail to describe it? Why do many 
more continue to move despite the perils? 
Reading the stories of those who have left Central America in search of safety reveals the 
hope that permeates the migrant narrative. Individuals move for a variety of reasons, each 
carrying a unique past and circumstance etched onto their identity: for a better life, to be with 
family again, to have enough to eat, not to have to live with death looming over the shoulders. 
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For Central Americans, the promise of the United States sits like a beacon on the horizon. Like a 
mirage in the desert, close enough to touch but collapsing in the distance as the miles of Mexico 
stretch out ahead of them. 
This paper is an attempt to bring these abuses to the surface, to examine in exhumation. 
To understand why thousands of Central Americans continue to make the decision each year to 
migrate to the United States and why as a society we have failed to address the spiraling 
insecurity they face in the country that stands in between themselves and safety. 
I move beyond death, however, to offer a level of hope as an argument that migration 
need not be at the risk of death. Day by day, humanity reveals itself along the migrant trail. An 
albergue nestled within a church in Chiapas provides water and shelter. A grandmother in 
Veracruz hands a meal to a man on a break from riding La Bestia. A professor in Mexico City 
volunteers her weekends to read to unaccompanied children far from home and making the 
journey alone. These are powerful displays of humanity and are evidence of the capacity of 
individuals to produce change. However, they are insufficient to address the extent of the crisis. 
Within North America, thousands of migrants are drowning on dry land. The state must find 
within itself a level of humanitarianism to reach out and offer a hand. 
As developed throughout this paper, several policy options are available to the 
government of Mexico that can begin to address the abuses that migrants face in its territory and 
ensure that the rights to security, due process, and refugee status are guaranteed for them. Ending 
the practice of detention during refugee status processing would offer a means of traversing the 
country legally free from networks of abuse and insecurity. Expanding refugee status to all those 
who need it, particularly in the North of Mexico in which reforms have been less extensive, 
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would ensure that migrants are informed of and receive the protections they are afforded in law. 
Lastly, granting the National Human Rights Commission prosecutorial authority and ensuring 
due process for human rights cases on a state level would provide recourse and discourage 
abuses from occurring. These policies, within Mexico’s reach, have the potential to improve the 
human rights situation for migrants and implement the progressive human rights law that exists 
already.  
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